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I. Introduction
In the world of finance, stock brokers facilitate transactions
for clients every day.1 Stock brokers help their clients make
financial decisions, tailoring the client’s investments to each
individual client’s abilities and overall objectives. 2 Investors trust
their brokers to make educated investment decisions and provide
advice in the investors’ best interests. 3 Additionally, they give their
brokers access to large amounts of money for investment, in some
instances even trusting their brokers with their entire life
savings.4 Therefore, it comes as no surprise that brokers operate
under the presence of authorities regulating their conduct. Like
the American Bar Association for lawyers, organizations exist to
hold brokers accountable in the securities industry. 5 One such
entity is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), an
organization providing rules and regulations for brokers to follow. 6
FINRA is a not-for-profit organization specifically made to ensure
1. See Eliot Norton, A Simple Purchase and Sale Through a Stock Broker,
8 HARV. L. REV. 435, 436 (1895) (stating that stock brokers act as agents for those
who wish to invest in securities).
2. See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old
Lady: A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability
Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 190 (1998) (“The
suit-ability rule requires a broker to make a customer-specific determination of
suitability and tailor her recommendations to the customer’s financial profile and
investment objective.”).
3. See Jeffrey M. Salas, Retirement Adrift: Financial Elder Abuse, 86 WIS.
LAW., Mar. 2013, at 18, 19 (presenting a hypothetical situation in which a client
entrusts his broker with his retirement funds).
4. See id. (noting that the hypothetical of a retired couple losing their
retirement fund is a reality to many Americans).
5. See infra Part II (discussing the various authorities and legislative acts
developed to provide oversight of the securities industry).
6. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
151, 152 (2008) (identifying FINRA as a Self-Regulatory Organization).
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fairness and honesty in the securities industry. 7 While FINRA is
not a federal or state governmental organization, the Securities
Exchange Act provides specific procedures FINRA must follow. 8 As
this Note will demonstrate, the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) oversight of FINRA leads some to believe that
FINRA acts in a governmental capacity.9 Furthermore, the
implication of FINRA as a quasi-governmental entity 10 allows the
argument for FINRA rules to constitute federal law, inherently
allowing federal jurisdiction for violations of FINRA rules. 11
A hypothetical situation provides clarity on the issue at hand.
An older investor recently employed a new stockbroker to set up
financial plans for retirement. The investor feels apprehensive
about investing in the securities markets, but the broker assures
the investor with the promise of investment advice suitable to the
investor’s specific goals of retirement. However, a year later the
investor finds that the broker encouraged investment of a
high-risk security with the investor’s money. Now the investor lost
the retirement savings in its entirety. While the investor considers
disciplinary proceedings against the broker,12 the investor hopes
to get at least some of the retirement savings back. The investor
will not find resolve in appealing directly to the SEC, but must
submit the dispute to FINRA arbitration. 13 During arbitration,
7. See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited Sept.
27, 2017) (providing information on what FINRA does for investors and members
of the Self-Regulatory Organization) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
8. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (requiring FINRA to register with the
SEC as well as comply with the SEC rules under threat of sanctions).
9. See infra Parts II, III and accompanying text (analyzing the structure of
the SEC in regards to FINRA).
10. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (“We describe several mechanisms that
appear to be driving the ‘self’ out of financial SROs, rendering them ever more
quasi-governmental in nature.”).
11. See infra Part V and accompanying text (arguing for exclusive federal
jurisdiction because FINRA rules should be considered federal law, exclusive
federal jurisdiction conforms with precedent, and exclusive federal jurisdiction
creates a uniform standard).
12. For the purposes of this Note, the issue regarding federal jurisdiction
does not involve FINRA’s disciplinary process. This Note is only concerned with
FINRA’s arbitration proceedings.
13. See Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA
Sanctions, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23, 23 (2013) (“FINRA, and not the
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however, the investor finds the FINRA arbitrators partial to the
broker and brokerage firm. Specifically, the arbitrators disregard
FINRA Rule 13505 14 by neglecting to force the broker or brokerage
firm to cooperate in discovery. 15 After the proceedings, the investor
finds the arbitration award grossly inadequate compared to the
amount of money lost in the bad investments. The investor files for
a vacatur of the FINRA arbitration award pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act § 10a.16 The key issue involves the FINRA
arbitrators’ violation of an internal FINRA rule. Before filing, the
investor decides whether to bring the suit in federal or state court.
While many different considerations go into a plaintiff’s decision
to file in state or federal court, some plaintiffs remain precluded
from exercising federal jurisdiction in some federal circuits. 17 The
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals allows federal jurisdiction for
violations of FINRA internal rules. 18 However, in the Third and
Second Circuits, state court remains the only option for a plaintiff
to file this claim deriving from a violation of an internal FINRA
rule. 19
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), is the regulator that
primarily addresses her concerns, the first through its arbitration forum.”).
14. See FINRA Rule 13505 (“The parties must cooperate to the fullest extent
practicable in the exchange of documents and information to expedite the
arbitration.”).
15. For purposes of this Note, arbitrators violating FINRA internal rules
provide a clear example of the issue. This situation creates a violation of an
internal rule as well as a ground for appeal of an arbitration award. Furthermore,
this takes the dispute out of the arbitration process and into a court of law.
16. See 9 U.S.C. § 10a (2012) (allowing vacatur of an arbitration award
where the award was procured by corruption or fraud, partiality is found among
the arbitrators, the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct, and the arbitrators
exceeded their powers). Additionally, an arbitration award may be vacated due to
manifest disregard of the law. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434–35 (1953),
overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“[A] failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would ‘constitute grounds for
vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.’”).
17. See, e.g., Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 249–50
(3d Cir. 2016) (disallowing federal jurisdiction for violations of internal FINRA
rules).
18. See generally Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2011).
19. See Goldman, 834 F.3d at 242 (falling under the Third Circuit’s
jurisdiction); Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 2016)
(falling under the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction).
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FINRA provides enforcement mechanisms and a system for
alternative dispute resolution. 20 When a broker violates one of the
SEC’s rules, the parties submit to compulsory arbitration
facilitated by FINRA to resolve the dispute. 21 FINRA arbitration
follows a simplistic format broken down into filing claims,
arbitrator selection, prehearing conferences, discovery, the
hearing, and the decision or awards. 22 FINRA arbitrators render
binding decisions on the two parties, and FINRA fails to provide
an internal appellate process. 23 While the arbitration process
provides decisions for many disputes between brokers and
investors, 24 it is not without error. 25 As a result, FINRA provides a
list of limited circumstances in which members may bring an
appeal to a court of law.26 However, in situations when an
arbitrator clearly disregards an internal FINRA rule, 27 the FINRA
20. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 173 (“The arbitration facilities of the NYSE
and the NASD will be combined in a separate entity as part of FINRA.”).
21. See id. at 172–73 (stating that members of Self-Regulatory
Organizations have had to submit to compulsory arbitration since the Supreme
Court allowed these contracts in 1987).
22. See Arbitration Process, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/arbitration-process (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (providing a brief
overview of the arbitration process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
23. See Decision & Award, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/decision-award (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“However, under federal
and state laws, there are limited grounds on which a court may hear a party's
appeal on an award.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See Richard Berry, The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s
Dispute Resolution Activities, SECURITIES ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION HOT
TOPICS 2016 (New York City Bar Association), April 2016 (“The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) operates the largest securities dispute
resolution forum in the world. FINRA annually administers between 4,000 and
8,500 arbitrations and numerous mediations.”).
25. See, e.g., Royal All. Assocs., Inc. v. Liebhaber, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 819
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (affirming the lower court’s decision to vacate the arbitration
award due to the FINRA arbitrators substantially prejudicing one of the parties);
Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 190 So. 3d 895, 925
(Ala. 2015) (requiring vacatur of a FINRA arbitration award due to the
arbitrators’ failure to disclose relationship with broker-dealer); Citigroup Glob.
Mkts.’, Inc. v. Berghorst, No. 11–80250–CIV, 2012 WL 5989628, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 20, 2012) (vacating the FINRA arbitration award due to evident partiality
or corruption by the arbitrators).
26. See Decision & Award, supra note 23 (listing six separate situations
where a party may appeal an arbitration award).
27. See id. (stating that this is known as Manifest Disregard of the Law).
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regulations remain unclear as to whether these appeals should be
brought in federal or state court. 28 If arbitrators disregard a clearly
defined law applicable to the case before them,29 where should the
disadvantaged party bring the appeal? Are there benefits of
bringing an appeal to a state court as opposed to a federal court, or
are the federal courts a more appropriate forum to bring these
appeals? As it stands, the federal circuit courts are split as to the
appropriate jurisdiction for this key issue. 30 Fundamentally, the
issue hinges on whether FINRA’s internal rules qualify as federal
law, or in the alternative that violations of FINRA internal rules
raise a substantial federal issue qualifying for federal question
jurisdiction. 31
Analysis of the underlying jurisdictional question requires
understanding of the relationship between FINRA and the SEC.
In order to appreciate the nuances and importance of this
relationship, one must also appreciate the historical context of
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SRO) coinciding with the SEC, an
independent federal agency.32 Government oversight of SROs in
the realm of finance developed over time through many
promulgations and amendments to legislation, such as the
28. See FINRA Rule 12904(b) (“Unless the applicable law directs otherwise,
all awards rendered under the Code are final and are not subject to review or
appeal.”). However, the Federal Arbitration Act and specific state statutes
constitute applicable law, and allow for vacatur of an arbitration award in very
narrow circumstances. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (“In any of the following cases
the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration.”); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2(a) (West 2002) (giving
six different reasons for vacatur of an arbitration award).
29. See, e.g., FINRA Rule 13505 (“The parties must cooperate to the fullest
extent practicable in the exchange of documents and information to expedite the
arbitration.”).
30. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (analyzing the key issues
involved in the circuit split).
31. Compare Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that violations of internal FINRA rules warrant federal jurisdiction), with
Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts, Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 258 (3d Cir. 2016) (disputing
a claim for federal jurisdiction of a violation of an internal FINRA rule).
32. See Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit:
Self-Regulatory Organizations and Absolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201,
202 (2012) (“Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) have consistently been deemed
to ‘stand in the shoes’ of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by
carrying out delegated, regulatory functions in interpreting and monitoring the
securities laws.”).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 Throughout the history of
American securities, members of the profession evaluated the
industry—often after market crashes 34—and promoted change in
pursuit of order and regularity. 35 Members trading in these
markets met and established rules. 36 For example, the first
meeting was the “Buttonwood Agreement,” where members met
after a market crash in 1792 and agreed to deal among
themselves. 37 Members of this group later reconvened in 1817 and
created a constitution for the New York Stock and Exchange
Board. 38 Eventually, the idea of self-regulation led to the
formalization of SROs. 39
Securities exchanges, commonly known as stock exchanges,
provide an organized forum for buyers and sellers engaging in
stock transactions. 40 SROs regulate the securities exchanges by
disciplining errant members41 and setting forth rules and
33. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 151 (illustrating the merging of
self-regulatory organizations).
34. See id. at 153 (“Congress and the SEC have struggled to convert SROs
from ‘private clubs’ to public bodies, frequently exploiting scandals to impose
governance reforms on exchanges and the NASD.”).
35. See generally Kenneth Durr & Robert Colby, The Institution of
Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-2010,
SEC HIST. SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/
sro/sro02b.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (beginning chronologically with the
organization of members of the New York stock exchange in 1792) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See id. (providing examples of these rules such as the structure for selling
stocks, the delivery of the stocks, and discipline for members).
37. See id. (noting the legend and myth behind the agreement and providing
articles arguing the verity of this legend).
38. See id. (stating that in 1817 members who originally signed the
Buttonwood Agreement created the New York Stock and Exchange Board
imposing initiation fees and admission standards).
39. See id. (changing the name from the New York Stock and Exchange
Board to the New York Stock Exchange in 1863).
40. See Comment, Over-the-Counter Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE
L.J. 633, 635 (1939) (contrasting securities exchanges and over-the-counter
markets).
41. See, e.g., Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2014)
(upholding a lifetime bar on a principal broker from participation in the securities
industry rendered by FINRA due to failure of the principal to supervise an
associate broker); Cody v. SEC, 693 F.3d 251, 253–54 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding the
broker to have mismanaged accounts under his supervision and placing sanctions
on the broker including suspension and fines); Mathis v. SEC, 671 F.3d 210, 214–
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procedures for brokers and dealers to follow. 42 Today, SROs remain
the primary source of protection for investors; 43 however,
government oversight of the industry did not begin until 1934
under the Securities Exchange Act.44 SROs evolved through three
pieces of legislation, each of which will be discussed in further
detail within this Note: the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,45 the
Maloney Act of 1938,46 and the Exchange Act Amendments of
1975.47
This Note analyzes each Act to create a foundation of
understanding for regulations within the securities realm, 48 and
then examines the FINRA’s role within that landscape. 49 An
examination of the SEC’s role in oversight accompanies this
analysis. 50 Next, this Note will identify relevant case-law
examining how courts previously treated SROs internal rules. 51
Following the treatment by the courts of prior SRO internal
rules, 52 analysis will turn towards the federal circuit cases
15 (2d Cir. 2012) (sanctioning an individual for failing to disclose tax liens filed
against him by the Internal Revenue Service on his application for registry as a
securities broker).
42. See Pacella, supra note 32, at 207 (listing the different functions of
SROs).
43. See Christopher W. Cole, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA): Is the Consolidation of NASD and the Regulatory Arm of NYSE a Bull
or a Bear for U.S. Capital Markets?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 251, 252 (2007) (stating
that securities laws at times preempt antitrust claims).
44. See Durr & Colby, supra note 35 (stating that the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was a compromise between government regulation and SRO
independence).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).
46. Over-the-Counter Market Act, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
47. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
48. See infra Part II and accompanying text (examining the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Maloney Act, and the Exchange Act Amendments of
1975).
49. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text (showing the importance of
FINRA’s role in the securities industry today).
50. See infra Part III and accompanying text (identifying the SEC’s
extensive control over FINRA).
51. See infra Parts C, D and accompanying text (examining prior case-law
involving the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers).
52. See infra Part C and accompanying text (distinguishing between alleged
claims involving violations of the securities laws which prompted federal
jurisdiction and claims of alleged violations of SRO internal rules which did not
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currently in dispute on the issue of characterization of FINRA
internal rules and the underlying question of jurisdiction. 53
Finally, this Note will offer a solution to the question of
appropriate jurisdiction for the characterization of FINRA internal
rules. 54 Currently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Merrell Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning55 leaves the question of
exclusive federal jurisdiction open to interpretation in regards to
violations of internal FINRA rules. This allows plaintiffs to
formulate claims without mention of federal law in order to place
disputes in state court. 56
II. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Self-Regulation
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The lasting effects of the Great Depression sparked
governmental regulation under President Roosevelt’s New Deal
administration. 57 The New Deal provided a time of government
oversight from which the securities industry was not exempt. 58
Before the New Deal, brokers remained under limited supervision
from the Federal Government,59 but many felt protection for
necessarily prompt federal jurisdiction).
53. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (identifying the circuit split in
the Second, Third, and Ninth circuits).
54. See infra Part V and accompanying text (arguing for federal jurisdiction
for violations of internal FINRA rules).
55. 136 S.Ct. 1562 (2016).
56. See Case Comment, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Manning, 130 HARV. L. REV. 417, 425 (2016) (noting the ability for clever plaintiffs
to avoid federal jurisdiction).
57. See Richard B. Stewart, Evaluating the New Deal, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 239, 240 (1998) (“[T]he New Deal firmly established the proposition that
the federal government ought to take responsibility for the overall productivity
and health of the economy at the macro-economic level.”).
58. See A. C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New
Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 846–47 (2009) (providing examples of New Deal
legislation including the Securities Act of 1933 that provided for governmental
regulation of public offerings and most notably the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which regulated trading practices and established the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
59. See John Hanna, The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1934) (stating that the U.S. government took a laissez-faire stance
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investors was necessary after the collapse in the Stock Market. 60
In response to this perceived need, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 established the SEC.61 The Act imposed integrated regulation
on the securities industry, 62 and left some troubled by the slight
break from laissez-faire economics of the past.63 Furthermore, the
Act fomented oversight of the self-regulatory system,
encompassing regulations for the stock exchanges such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 64 Mandatory regulations included
the requirement of the individual stock exchanges to register with
the SEC, 65 registration of securities on the national stock
exchanges,66 and oversight of the national stock exchanges by the
SEC. 67 Due to the regulations placed on SROs by the SEC, scholars
argue that SROs act as governmental entities in some capacity. 68
Specifically, William A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson argue
that “mechanisms of governmentalization” 69 lead to increased
before promulgation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
60. See Durr & Colby, supra note 35 (stating that after the Great Depression,
those in the Roosevelt Administration were convinced that the securities industry
required government oversight).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).
62. See Hanna, supra note 59, at 1 (“[I]ntegrated industry is one which digs
its own raw material out of its own land, transports it by its own carriers,
manufactures it through many stages into finished products, moves the products
to its own selling depots, and disposes of the output through its own selling
organization.”).
63. See id. (regarding the Exchange Act of 1934 as a complete integration of
the “manufacturing” involved in the securities industry).
64. See Durr & Colby, supra note 35 (positing that the Exchange Act of 1934
created a self-regulatory model).
65. See Hanna, supra note 5962, at 16 (noting the New York Stock Exchange
and all the other major exchanges already registered under the Securities and
Exchange Commission at the time).
66. See id. at 19 (outlining the requirements for registration of securities
under Sections 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
67. See id. at 20 (requiring a national stock exchange to certify the security
wishing to register on the market and allowing the SEC to refuse registration).
68. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 159–71 (noting the structure and
governance of FINRA under the SEC and the fact that FINRA is solely
accountable to the SEC as arguments that FINRA acts as a governmental
agency); Jerrod M. Lukacs, Much Ado About Nothing: How the Securities SRO
State Actor Circuit Split Has Been Misinterpreted and What It Means for Due
Process at FINRA, 47 GA. L. REV. 923, 928 (2013) (outlining the arguments and
recent circuit split considering FINRA as a state actor and a governmental agent).
69. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 10, at 26–51 (identifying eight
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governmental regulation of SROs,70 and could lead to complete
governmental control of these entities. 71 In fact, one author
theorized that due to the wide authority given to FINRA by the
SEC, FINRA has the qualities of a federal government agency.72 If
SROs act as federal governmental entities, then there is a strong
argument for violations of SRO internal rules warranting federal
jurisdiction.
B. The Maloney Act of 1938
While the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided oversight
for SROs of the securities exchanges, a distinct lack of government
regulation for over-the-counter brokers and dealers remained. 73
Over-the-counter brokers and dealers facilitate purchases and
sales that do not take place on one of the national securities
exchanges.74 Authorities in 1938 argued that the generality of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required further legislation due to
the failure of regulation for the over-the-counter trade market. 75
different mechanisms for governmentalization of SROs including, for example,
the type of entities regulated, the increasing size of losses, and changes in
industry structure).
70. See id. at 24 (“Over the past few decades, some financial SROs appear to
have lost much of the ‘self’ in self-regulatory organization, and that element of
independence has been replaced with a more governmental approach. We call the
process by which this is happening the ‘governmentalization’ of SROs.”)
71. See id. (“Whether they fully appreciate it or not, financial SROs are
transforming into a ‘fifth branch’ of government.”). The authors give alternative
solutions to this push towards SROs becoming the “fifth branch” of government
by, for example, discontinuing the process of SRO rule promulgation. See id. at
64. The authors, however, also acknowledge that discontinuing the process
requires strong political support which seems unlikely. See id.
72. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 152 (concluding that classifying FINRA as
a governmental agency is premature).
73. See Durr & Colby, supra note 35 (“Whereas the Exchange Act had
created a new self-regulatory model that enveloped the NYSE and the regional
exchanges into a scheme of federal securities regulation, the Maloney Act
extended that model to entities other than exchanges.”)
74. See William Taft Lesh, Federal Regulation of Over-the-Counter Brokers
and Dealers in Securities, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (1946) (outlining the
substantive law for regulation of over-the-counter brokers).
75. See Comment, supra note 40, at 634 (“The Maloney Act is the result of
some four years of research and study by both the Commission and
representatives of the over-the-counter industry.” (citing Chester T. Lane,
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Then in 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act to amend the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.76 The Act sought to make
over-the-counter dealers regulate their own activities with
government supervision. 77 Specifically, the Act created two
provisions: the first provision called for the creation of voluntary
self-regulatory organizations to establish rules and regulations
with the power to sanction errant behavior; 78 the second provision
gave the SEC the power of oversight of the over-the-counter
market.79 The Maloney Act integrated the purpose of SROs,
common in today’s securities industry, to cover over-the-counter
market trading.80 These amendments led to the registration of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 81 At first,
NASD was a self-regulatory organization without a stock
exchange.82 The SEC later required membership in NASD for all
broker-dealers registered by the SEC.83 However, in 1971, NASD
created the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation system (NASDAQ), which was an electronic securities
market.84 Eventually, NASD merged with the regulatory branch of
Address before the Investment Bankers’ Association of America at San Francisco,
California, S.E.C. Release (Mar. 11, 1938)).
76. See generally Tamar Hed-Hofmann, The Maloney Act Experiment, 6 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 187 (1965) (championing the success of the NASD to
register as a regulatory association).
77. See id. at 187 (allowing associations of broker-dealers to register under
the SEC).
78. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (providing different examples
of SROs disciplining errant members).
79. See Comment, supra note 40, at 634 (identifying the importance of
individuals in the over-the-counter market industry to conform to the Maloney
Act).
80. See Pacella, supra note 32, at 207 (“The exchanges and non-exchanges
that are regulated by the Exchange Act are known today as SROs, with some of
the most common examples being FINRA, NASDAQ, NASD, NYSE, the Chicago
Stock Exchange, and the International Securities Exchange.”)
81. See id. (stating that NASD was the only association to register in lieu of
the Maloney Act Amendments).
82. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 160–63 (stating that the NASD originally
was a voluntary organization to regulate over-the-counter market trading
separate of securities exchange).
83. See id. at 153 (noting this requirement of membership began in 1983).
84. See id. at 161 (“Today, Nasdaq is completely separated from the NASD,
is a public company, and is recognized by the SEC as a stock exchange.”).
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the NYSE to create FINRA in 2007.85 Through this merging, the
securities industry gained a single set of regulations which
members must follow through FINRA. 86 The standardization of
securities industry regulations and the oversight of these
regulations by the SEC promote the idea of exclusive federal
jurisdiction for violations of FINRA rules.
C. The Exchange Act Amendments of 1975
The next prominent piece of legislation changing the
relationship between the SEC and SROs was the Exchange Act
Amendments of 1975.87 These amendments addressed the
financial crisis occurring from 1968 to 1971.88 The 1975
Amendments required SROs to submit proposed rule changes to
the SEC for notice and comment rulemaking.89 While these
amendments promoted the impact of SROs on the securities
industry, they also created sweeping oversight of these bodies. 90
Those in favor of a laissez-faire economic plan fundamentally
85. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)–(kk) (2012)).
86. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 10, at 23 (“According to NASD,
additional benefits were to ‘streamline the broker-dealer regulatory system,
combine technologies, and permit the establishment of a single set of rules and a
single set of examiners with complementary areas of expertise within a single
SRO.’” (citing Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Related to Consolidation
of Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,188 (Aug. 1, 2007))).
87. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 159–60 (“In 1975, the Exchange Act was
amended and the SEC obtained greater authority to regulate and supervise the
NYSE, other exchanges and the NASD.”).
88. See Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Joint Securities
Conference 1975: The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Self-Regulation and
the National Market System (Nov. 18, 1975) (stating that the Commission
received an unexpected high volume in trades and then the stock prices crashed
causing the financial crisis from 1968 to 1971).
89. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2554 (2006) (noting two major aspects of the legislation
including further oversight by the SEC and creating the National Market
System).
90. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 162 (“However, this Act strengthened the
SEC’s oversight role by, among other things, giving the SEC the power to initiate
as well as approve SRO rule-making, expanding the SEC’s role in SRO
enforcement and discipline, and allowing the SEC to play an active role in
structuring the trading markets.”).
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objected to the idea of further regulation, but the SEC found it
necessary to implement these amendments after the economic
crisis. 91
Today, the Securities Exchange Act provides specific
procedures for SROs to follow when changing their internal
rules. 92 First, an SRO must file a copy of the proposed rule, the
proposed rule change, or a rule deletion to the SEC. 93 Additionally,
the SRO must provide a concise general statement of basis and
purpose of the rule change. 94 After filing the proposed rule change
with the SEC, the SEC will publish notice of the rule change and
provide the issues involved or any terms of substance. 95 The SEC
then gives interested persons time for meaningful comment
through written data, views, and arguments.96 SRO rule changes
do not become law unless authorized by the SEC. 97 Additionally,
the SEC may create rules for individual SROs following a similar
procedure, but without the influence from the individual SRO. 98
Overall, the breadth of oversight by the SEC provides a substantial
federal influence on SRO’s internal rules. Violations of these SRO
rules, with immense oversight from the SEC, prompts arguments
for federal jurisdiction.

91. See Loomis, supra note 88 (noting the fact that Congressional
Committees conducted research on the securities markets).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. (“No proposed rule change shall take effect unless approved by
the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection.”).
98. See id. § 78s(c) (“The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and
delete from (hereinafter in this subsection collectively referred to as ‘amend’) the
rules of a self-regulatory organization.”).
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III. Background
A. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
FINRA originated in 2007 99 through the merging of the NASD
and the NYSE’s regulatory body.100 Unlike other SROs of the past,
however, FINRA fails to serve a commercial purpose because it
lacks a stock exchange. 101 Instead, the SEC instituted FINRA to
create a monopoly on SROs.102
In addition to its regulatory and enforcement functions,
FINRA provides many different services to investors. 103 These
services include: access to brokers’ conduct history; 104 access to
prior arbitration awards,105 FINRA market data,106 and

99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (citing the statute that merged
the National Association of Securities Dealers and the regulatory arm of the New
York Stock Exchange).
100. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 152 (“The stated purpose for the
consolidation of the NASD and NYSE’s regulatory arm is to bring more efficiency
to securities industry regulatory efforts by creating a single rule book for
broker-dealers.”).
101. See id. (concluding that FINRA should not be classified as a government
agency despite its investigative and disciplinary functions).
102. See id. at 153–54 (“[T]he monopoly status of FINRA strengthens its role
as a regulator of broker-dealers.”).
103. See Tools & Calculators, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/tools
(last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (providing multiple tools which investors can use
through the FINRA website) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. See FINRA Broker Check, FINRA, https://brokercheck.finra.org/ (last
visited Sept. 27, 2017) (allowing an investor or any member of the public to search
a broker or firm in their area, providing conduct history and licensing information
about the broker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See Arbitration Awards, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/arbitration-awards (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (allowing members of
the public to research past arbitration awards rendered by FINRA and NASD free
of charge) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. See Market Data, FINRA, http://finra-markets.morningstar.com/
MarketData/Default.jsp (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (providing members of the
public with market and investment research to assist investors) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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preventative data 107 helping minimize investor vulnerability to
fraud. 108
Imperative to FINRA’s regulatory authority is FINRA’s
arbitration process. 109 Because investors victimized by their
brokers cannot seek relief directly from the SEC,110 investors bring
the dispute to FINRA arbitration.111 FINRA provides options for
investors to arbitrate or the parties can both agree to mediate
during or before the arbitration process. 112 Additionally, investors
may file investor complaints, which are separate claims for when
investors believe a specific broker is violating FINRA
regulations. 113 Internal rules of a SRO refer to the rules that the
SRO makes and apply to members of the SROs. 114 Specifically,
FINRA retains its own internal rules for members to follow. 115 In
107. See Risk Meter, FINRA, http://apps.finra.org/meters/1/riskmeter.aspx
(last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (allowing potential investors to take a test to
determine whether they are at risk for investment fraud) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. See Tools & Calculators, supra note 103 (providing hyperlinks to specific
investor services).
109. See
generally
Arbitration
and
Mediation,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/overview (last visited Sept. 27,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. See FINRA Rule 13200 (“Except as otherwise provided in the Code, a
dispute must be arbitrated under the Code if the dispute arises out of the business
activities of a member or an associated person and is between or among: members;
members and associated persons; or associated persons.”).
111. See Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Non-waivable Right to Choose
Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383, 384
(2016) (“To prevent investors from having a unilateral right to demand
arbitration, virtually all brokerage firms include provisions in their form
contracts with retail customers requiring arbitration of customers’ disputes in an
SRO forum, primarily FINRA’s Office of Dispute Resolution.”).
112. See Arbitration and Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
arbitration-and-mediation/overview (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (providing an
overview of the arbitration and mediation process) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
113. See id. (explaining that filing a claim for arbitration or mediation to a
monetary dispute differs from an investor complaint in that an investor complaint
makes FINRA aware of any activity of a broker that may be fraudulent). For
purposes of this Note, analysis primarily relies on the arbitration process.
114. See 69 AM. JUR. 2d Securities Regulation-Federal § 319 (2017) (“These
internal regulations now supplement the requirements of the Exchange Act and
form a large part of the overall regulation of securities transactions on exchanges
for the protection of investors.”).
115. See Rules and Guidance, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/rules-
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the context of violations of internal FINRA rules, an arbitrator’s
“clear manifest disregard” for the rules provides a clear example of
the issue at hand.116 Because limited circumstances exist for
vacatur of an arbitration award,117 this Note focuses on the
violation of FINRA internal rules by the arbitrator. The main
analysis will focus on FINRA’s internal rules and whether a
violation of one of those rules constitutes a violation of federal law
prompting federal question jurisdiction. 118 Analysis will include
the difficulties presented by each side of the argument for state
jurisdiction and federal jurisdiction. 119 Additionally, the
arguments will be supplemented by prior case-law involving other
SROs. 120 As this Note will demonstrate, violations of internal
FINRA rules deserve exclusive federal jurisdiction due to the
structure of FINRA, its relation to the SEC, and prior case-law.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction
To understand the arguments for FINRA internal rules falling
under either federal jurisdiction or state jurisdiction, one must
examine the statute granting federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and-guidance (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“As part of its mandate to protect
investors and promote market integrity, FINRA enacts rules and publishes
guidance in its role as regulator of securities firms and brokers.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
116. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“As explained in Greenberg, federal-question jurisdiction lies on the face of the
petition where ‘the petitioner complains principally and in good faith that the
award was rendered in manifest disregard of federal law.’” (citing Greenberg v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000))).
117. See 9 U.S.C. § 10a (2012) (allowing vacatur of an arbitration award
where the arbitrators are guilty of misconduct). Additionally, an arbitration
award may be vacated due to manifest disregard of the law. See Wilko v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“In unrestricted
submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations
of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”).
118. See infra Parts IV–V and accompanying text (examining current caselaw on the issue).
119. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (demonstrating the struggles
between the circuits in implementing a bright-line rule).
120. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text (evaluating different courts’
decisions regarding violations of NYSE and NASD internal rules).
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provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.”121 Courts often begin analysis with this
statute when examining disputes regarding violations of internal
FINRA rules constituting federal law. 122 However, the main
statute providing jurisdiction for violations of SRO rules resides in
the Securities Exchange Act.123 The Securities Exchange Act
provides a grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction. 124 The relevant
statute is 15 U.S.C. § 78aa as amended, with courts often referring
to the statute as § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act. 125 The statute
provides that the district courts shall have “exclusive jurisdiction
of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder.” 126 Exclusive federal jurisdiction requires that a state
court evaluate the claims at hand and determine whether federal
jurisdiction is appropriate. 127 Due to the nature of SRO rule
promulgation, including the need for SEC approval, these statutes
present an ambiguity regarding whether violations of SRO
internal rules warrant federal jurisdiction or require resolution in
state court. 128 Additionally, recent cases failed to provide a precise
decision on the issue. 129 The holdings of NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
122. See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 377 (paralleling the arising under test for
federal question jurisdiction to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa’s grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012) (“The district courts of the United States and
the United States courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder . . . .”).
124. Id. (emphasis added) Exclusive federal jurisdiction requires that state
courts evaluate the claims at hand to determine if federal jurisdiction is
appropriate. See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 425–26 (“However, section 27
establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction, rather than concurrent federal
jurisdiction as § 1331 does. As a result, it obliges state courts to undertake an
additional line of inquiry to ensure that a cause of action does not fall under
federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction before proceeding.”).
125. See, e.g., Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136
S.Ct. 1562, 1566 (2016) (“Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), 48 Stat. 992, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq.”).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
127. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that this could lead to
discrepancies among jurisdictions).
128. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (identifying the specific
procedures for notice and comment rulemaking under SEC oversight).
129. See generally Manning, 136 S. Ct. at 1568; NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v.
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v. UBS Securities, LLC 130 and Manning provide pertinent
arguments to the issue at hand, but ultimately require
clarification. Specifically, the Manning holding creates the current
test for federal jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 131
Fundamentally, Manning requires analysis under § 78aa to mimic
the “arising under” test found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.132 Yet
application to the specific issue of violations of FINRA rules
remains untested. Without clarification, the door remains open for
plaintiffs to specifically word their claims in order to avoid federal
jurisdiction. 133
C. Self-Regulatory Organizations and Circuit Rulings Involving
Organizations Other than FINRA
Prior to the creation of FINRA, federal courts ran into
problems regarding whether violations of other SRO internal rules
required resolution in state or federal court. 134 Federal court of
appeals cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits, for example,
provide specific arguments for appropriate jurisdiction over SRO’s
internal rules as state or federal law. 135 Often, these cases provide
UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).
130. 770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).
131. See Manning, 136 S. Ct. at 1570 (“If (but only if) such a case meets the
‘arising under’ standard, [§ 78aa] commands that it go to federal court.”).
132. See id. (stating that despite the difference in language between the two
statutes, the Court made the “arising under” test applicable to § 78aa as well).
133. See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 425 (stating that the Manning case
provides an opportunity for plaintiffs to stay in state court through artful
pleading); see also Dale & Harris, Federal Jurisdiction Over State Securities
Claims, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (June 10, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal
.com/id=1202759508231/Federal-Jurisdiction-Over-State-Securities-Claims (last
visited Sept. 27, 2017) (“Because of this uncertainty, a future plaintiff who wishes
to stay in state court may play it safe by ‘purg[ing] his complaint of any references
to federal securities law, so as to escape removal.’” (citing Manning, 136 S. Ct. at
1575)).
134. See, e.g., Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1996)
(providing an example of a case involving the New York Stock Exchange before
the creation of FINRA in 2007).
135. See id. at 55 (finding the plaintiff’s claims to be insufficiently substantial
to “arise under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); D’Alessio v.
N.Y. Stock Exch., 258 F.3d 93, 99–104 (2d Cir. 2001) (distinguishing the case in
Barbara due to the nature of the claim); see also Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (dealing with
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support recent disputes regarding jurisdiction over violations of
FINRA’s internal rules. 136 However, due to FINRA’s unique
structure as an SRO without a stock exchange, these arguments
present no definitive answer.137 The functions of the NYSE and
NASD held bifurcated functions: providing marketplaces for their
members and serving as regulators of the marketplace. 138
However, FINRA acts as a regulator over the entire securities
industry. 139 Therefore, its impact on the securities industry as a
whole differs from SROs of the past. Recent cases regarding
FINRA jurisdiction contain arguments that an SRO, when acting
as an organization, violating its own rules provides a more
substantial impact on the securities industry as a whole. 140
FINRA’s specific function as the sole regulatory entity of the
securities industry, however, provides argument for its substantial
impact on the system as a whole.141 While the holding in Manning
provides a different line of analysis for § 78aa, the following cases
remain pertinent to differing views of substantiality that
violations of internal SRO rules have on the securities industry. 142
NASD).
136. See Sacks v. Dietrich 663 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying on the
decision in Sparta Surgical which found federal subject matter jurisdiction where
the plaintiff’s claim alleged violation of internal rules of NASD).
137. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (stating that FINRA differs
from other SROs because it does not serve a commercial purpose).
138. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 153 (noting the practice of fixing
commissions under the marketplace function and disciplining errant members as
the regulatory function).
139. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 10, at 42 (“[S]ubstantial SEC
resources are spent on overseeing FINRA and its direct regulation of the
securities industry.”).
140. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 2016)
(stating that a difference remains between claims involving an SRO breaching its
own internal rules, such as the UBS Securities case, and claims like that of
Doscher’s involving someone other than the SRO violating internal rules).
141. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 10, at 23 (“The SEC Chairman,
Christopher Cox, noted that the SEC ‘will work closely with FINRA to eliminate
unnecessarily duplicative regulation, including consolidating and strengthening
what until now have been two different member rulebooks and two different
enforcement systems.’” (citing Press Release, SEC, SEC Gives Regulatory
Approval for NASD and NYSE Consolidation (July 27, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-151.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review))).
142. Compare Sparta Surgical, 159 F.3d at 1212 (noting the relationship
between the SEC and NASD, specifically in relation to rule promulgation), with
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Because the NYSE’s regulatory arm merged with the NASD
to create FINRA, NYSE cases provide helpful insight into
arguments for both state jurisdiction of SRO’s internal rules and
arguments for federal jurisdiction of internal rules. The first
pertinent case is Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange.143 In
Barbara, a former member of the NYSE claimed that the
administrators of the disciplinary proceedings violated the
internal rules of the NYSE. 144 Barbara initially brought his claim
in state court, alleging multiple violations by the defendants
including tortious interference with contractual relationships and
breach of a covenant of fair dealing within an implied contract. 145
After the defendants removed the case to federal court, the district
court dismissed the complaint and Barbara appealed to the Second
Circuit. 146 While neither party raised the question of whether
removal to federal court was proper, the Second Circuit ruled sua
sponte on the issue. 147 First, the court stated that the complaint
lacked a private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) 148 because
the plaintiff was not an investor but a member regulated by the
Exchange.149 Additionally, the Second Circuit found the state
courts to be a more suitable jurisdiction for Barbara because of the
contractual nature of the claims. 150 Specifically, the court found
Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1568–
70 (2016) (concentrating analysis on the language of the federal statute as well
as other federal statutes of similar language).
143. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49 (2d. Cir. 1996).
144. See id. at 51–53 (“Barbara alleged in his complaint that agents and
officers of the Division had wrongfully barred him from the Exchange floor,
thereby damaging Barbara’s reputation and causing him to lose employment
opportunities with two Exchange members, and ultimately to leave the securities
industry.”).
145. See id. at 52 (seeking $10 million in compensatory damages and $25
million in punitive damages).
146. See id. at 52–53 (dismissing the complaint due to the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies).
147. See id. at 53 (explaining that the district court erred in hearing Barbara’s
claims, but due to the circumstances of the case, the Second Circuit exercised
jurisdiction).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (2012) (requiring disciplinary action against
members of a national securities exchange for failure to follow rules or
regulations).
149. See Barbara, 99 F.3d at 54–55 (providing that investors fell under the
class of people protected by that section).
150. See id. at 55 (finding the plaintiff’s claims to be insufficiently substantial
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that “the rules of a securities exchange are contractual in
nature.”151 The court further noted that federal courts did not have
any special expertise in the area of contracts. 152 Although this case
fell under a dispute regarding the NYSE, the case retains
relevance to arguments involving other SRO’s internal rules. 153
Because almost all contracts between brokerage firms and
investors contain FINRA arbitration clauses, 154 parties in recent
decisions argue that states remain the ideal jurisdiction for
appeals regarding vacatur of FINRA arbitration awards.
However, the Second Circuit’s decision in D’Alessio v. New
York Stock Exch. 155 distinguished Barbara by finding the specific
nature of the claims to present a question in which federal
jurisdiction was appropriate. 156 Specifically, the Second Circuit
noted that D’Alessio claimed that the NYSE and its officers
conspired to violate SEC laws as well as laws that the NYSE
promulgated. 157 Unlike Barbara, in which the claims were solely
based on the suitability of NYSE disciplinary proceedings,
D’Alessio’s claims lacked any mention of disciplinary
proceedings. 158 Ultimately, the judicial decision required
interpretation of SEC laws as well as determination of the scope of
the NYSE’s duties under the Securities Exchange Act as a SRO. 159
to “arise under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
151. See id. at 54–55 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Georgiadis, 903 F.2d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 1990)).
152. See id. at 55 (finding that Barbara’s complaint failed to arise under
federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
153. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d
1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (using Barbara for arguments on immunity of a
self-regulatory organization (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 58
(2d Cir.1996)).
154. See Gross, supra note 111, at 384 (noting that courts enforce these
clauses strictly to their terms).
155. 258 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
156. See id. at 101 (“We find the facts present in this case distinguishable
from those in Barbara, and conclude that the instant suit implicates a federal
interest sufficiently substantial to confer subject matter jurisdiction under section
1331.”).
157. See id. at 101–02 (finding D’Alessio’s claims to be rooted in federal law
instead of state law).
158. See id. (demonstrating the need for allegations of violations of federal
law in order for federal subject matter jurisdiction to be granted).
159. See id. (noting specifically that the alleged misconduct by the NYSE
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The Second Circuit found D’Alessio’s complaints based on the SEC
laws and the interpretation of those laws by the NYSE raised a
substantial federal question, and found federal jurisdiction
appropriate. 160 While D’Alessio and Barbara involved
interpretation of the disciplinary proceedings of SROs,161 the
arguments presented by each case provide helpful insight into the
arguments for both sides of the issue regarding violations of
FINRA internal rules. 162 Specifically, D’Alessio provided federal
jurisdiction over an SRO interpreting a SEC law, as opposed to an
SRO interpreting its own internal rules. 163
NASD merged with the regulatory body of the NYSE to form
FINRA. 164 One of the key cases involving federal jurisdiction was
Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. 165 In Sparta Surgical, NASD de-listed Sparta
Surgical Corporation’s public offering and suspended trading of the
stock, effectively rendering the stock unmarketable.166 Sparta
Surgical’s claim relied on NASD’s violation of its own rules and
regulations for listing and de-listing stocks. 167 The Ninth Circuit
consisted of false interpretations of the federal laws involving D’Alessio’s
activities).
160. See id. at 102–03 (finding additionally that the NYSE’s inability to fulfill
its general oversight function qualified the case for federal jurisdiction).
161. The issue of disciplinary proceedings of SROs is not the central issue of
this Note. However, D’Alessio provides an important distinction between an SRO
interpreting an SEC rule, and an SRO interpreting its own internal rules.
162. See Sacks v. Dietrich 663 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying on the
reasoning in Sparta Surgical); Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372,
376 (2d Cir. 2016) (directly disputing the holding in Sparta Surgical).
163. See D’Alessio, 258 F.3d at 101 (“[A]n examination of the allegations
contained in the complaint establishes that D’Alessio’s suit is rooted in violations
of federal law, which favors a finding that federal question jurisdiction exists.”).
164. See NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, FINRA (July 30, 2007),
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-regulationcombine-form-financial-industry-regulatory-authority (last visited Sept. 17,
2017) (announcing the merging of the NASD and the NYSE to form FINRA) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
165. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealerts, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209
(9th Cir. 1998).
166. See id. at 1211 (suspending trading without explanation and resuming
trading the next day).
167. See id. at 1212 (“Here, although Sparta’s theories are posited as state
law claims, they are founded on the defendants’ conduct in suspending trading
and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined
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found federal jurisdiction appropriate due to the nature of the
claim. 168 The court placed special emphasis on the fact that the
NASD listing and de-listing rules “were issued pursuant to the
Exchange Act’s directive that self-regulatory organizations adopt
rules and by-laws in conformance with the Exchange Act.” 169
Specifically, the procedure that SROs must follow in order to
promulgate, add to, or delete rules includes approval by the
SEC. 170 Due to the relationship between the SRO and the SEC in
the rule-making process, the court found the alleged violations of
NASD rules requiring federal jurisdiction. 171 Federal Courts are
granted exclusive jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa “over actions
brought ‘to enforce any liability or duty’ created by exchange
rules.” 172 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found federal jurisdiction
appropriate for alleged violations of NASD violating its own rules
and regulations. 173 Alternatively, Sparta Surgical argued against
federal jurisdiction, reasoning that there must be a private right of
action for enforcement of a federal right. 174 Because there was no
private cause of action for breaching SRO rules, Sparta Surgical
believed federal jurisdiction was inappropriate. 175 However, the
by federal law.”).
168. See id. at 1213 (finding federal subject matter jurisdiction existed at the
time of removal).
169. See id. at 1212 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (2012)).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2012) (“The Commission, by rule, may abrogate,
add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization . . . to insure
the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization . . . .”).
171. See Sparta Surgical, F.3d at 1212 (finding federal jurisdiction would
have been established even if the complaint did not rely on violations of NASD’s
own rules).
172. See id. (stating that despite Sparta Surgical’s attempt to articulate the
claims in the form of state actions, federal jurisdiction applied).
173. See id. (stating that federal jurisdiction would not have been found if
grounded solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331). However, analysis of § 78aa has changed
pursuant to the decision in Manning, requiring application of the “arising under”
test. See Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,
1567 (2016) (“[W]e read [§ 78aa] as conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction of the
same suits as ‘aris[e] under’ the Exchange Act pursuant to the general federal
question statute.”).
174. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d
1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Sparta contests this conclusion . . . for the proposition
that federal question jurisdiction cannot lie absent a private right of action to
enforce the federal right.”).
175. See id. (stating that Sparta Surgical’s argument would have retained
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Ninth Circuit found this argument unpersuasive, stating that
searching for a private cause of action invoked federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.176 Furthermore, the court held
that the present case invoked 15 U.S.C. § 78aa “which vests
exclusive jurisdiction over claims concerning duties created by
exchange rules in the federal courts.” 177
D. The Manning Decision
Recently, Manning abrogated Barbara and Sparta
Surgical. 178 Importantly, Manning defined the scope of 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa, the exclusive federal jurisdiction grant to claims enforcing
any liability or duty created under the Securities Exchange Act. 179
The case did not involve SROs, but involved the SEC’s Regulation
SHO 180 which regulates and investigates short sales on the
market.181 Greg Manning, an investor, filed a complaint against
Merrill Lynch and other financial institutions for devaluing stocks
that Manning held due to naked short sales allegedly committed
by the financial institutions. 182 Manning originally brought the
merit if federal jurisdiction solely depended on § 1331).
176. Id.
177. Id. However, as previously stated, the present test for federal jurisdiction
under § 78aa is the “arising under” test.
178. Manning, 136 S. Ct. at 1562.
179. See Id. at 1566 (“We hold today that the jurisdictional test established
by that provision is the same as the one used to decide if a case ‘arises under’ a
federal law.”).
180. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.203–242.204 (2015) (“Regulation SHO, which
became fully effective on January 3, 2005, sets forth the regulatory framework
governing short sales.”).
181. See Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct.
1562, 1566 (2016) (“The SEC regulates such short sales at the federal level: The
Commission's Regulation SHO, issued under the Exchange Act, prohibits short
sellers from intentionally failing to deliver securities and thereby curbs market
manipulation.”).
182. See id.
A typical short sale of a security is one made by a borrower, rather than
an owner, of stock. In such a transaction, a person borrows stock from
a broker, sells it to a buyer on the open market, and later purchases
the same number of shares to return to the broker. The short seller’s
hope is that the stock price will decline between the time he sells the
borrowed shares and the time he buys replacements to pay back his
loan. If that happens, the seller gets to pocket the difference (minus
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claim in state court, but the financial institutions removed the case
to federal court. 183 While the complaint alleged state court claims,
Manning cited Regulation SHO.184 Merrill Lynch’s original claim
for federal jurisdiction rested on two grounds:185 general federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa of the
Securities Exchange Act. 186 After reversal by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, remanding the case to state court, the Supreme
Court accepted Merrill Lynch’s writ of certiorari based on the
circuit split involving Barbara and Sparta Surgical. 187
Additionally, Merrill Lynch sought the Supreme Court’s review
solely on the federal question jurisdiction claim under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa of the Securities Exchange Act. 188 The Supreme Court’s
opinion began by noting each party’s interpretation of § 78aa. 189
Merrill Lynch provided an expansive interpretation of § 78aa,
averring that if a plaintiff’s complaint either explicitly or implicitly
claims that a defendant breached an Exchange Act duty, then
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 190 The
Court noted that this effectively granted federal jurisdiction to a
plaintiff bringing only claims grounded in state law, allowing a
associated transaction costs). In a “naked” short sale, by contrast, the
seller has not borrowed (or otherwise obtained) the stock he puts on
the market, and so never delivers the promised shares to the buyer.
183. See id. at 1567 (“Manning brought his complaint in New Jersey state
court, but Merrill Lynch removed the case to Federal District Court.”).
184. See id. at 1566 (“Manning chose not to bring any claims under federal
securities laws or rules. His complaint, however, referred explicitly to Regulation
SHO, both describing the purposes of that rule and cataloguing past accusations
against Merrill Lynch for flouting its requirements.”).
185. See id. at 1567 (“Merrill Lynch asserted federal jurisdiction on two
grounds.”).
186. See id. (noting that the District Court denied Manning’s motion to
remand the case to state court).
187. See id. at 1567 n.1 (citing Barbara as construing § 27 more narrowly and
Sparta Surgical as a broad interpretation of § 27).
188. See id. (“Merrill Lynch sought this Court’s review solely as to whether
§ 27 commits Manning’s case to federal court.”).
189. See id. at 1568–69 (interpreting Merrill Lynch’s arguments for federal
jurisdiction first and then framing Manning’s arguments against federal
jurisdiction).
190. See id. at 1568 (“Whenever (says Merrill Lynch) a plaintiff’s complaint
either explicitly or implicitly ‘assert[s]’ that ‘the defendant breached an Exchange
Act duty,’ then the suit is ‘brought to enforce’ that duty and a federal court has
exclusive jurisdiction.”).

IF IT QUACKS LIKE A DUCK

1721

plaintiff to win on those claims without proving breach of an
Exchange Act duty.191
The Court, however, found this interpretation too broad in
scope. 192 Manning read the “brought to enforce” language of the
Exchange Act as conferring jurisdiction only if the Exchange Act
created the claim.193 While the Court acknowledged that plaintiffs
asserting a cause of action under the Exchange Act fall under
federal jurisdiction, it reasoned that it is not the exclusive way to
achieve it.194 If a plaintiff’s claim, grounded in state law, depends
on whether the defendant breached the Securities Exchange Act,
then it is “brought to enforce” a duty created by the Exchange Act
and federal jurisdiction is appropriate. 195
Most importantly, the Court concluded that a case asserting
§ 78aa under the Exchange Act must meet the “arising under”
standard of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.196 Therefore, a party seeking federal
jurisdiction under § 78aa with a state-law claim requires the claim
to “necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without
disturbing any congressionally approved balance” of federal and
state power.197 The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision
rejecting Merrill Lynch’s claim for federal jurisdiction. 198 Manning
represents the key to interpreting § 78aa of the Securities
Exchange Act. The current circuit split regarding FINRA internal
rules rests on this interpretation due to the disputed issue over
whether violation of FINRA internal rules create a substantial

191. See id. (noting arguments found in Merrill Lynch’s brief that the focus
was not on what the court would have to decide).
192. See id. (“But a natural reading of § 27’s text does not extend so far.”).
193. See id. at 1569 (“On that view, everything depends on (as Justice Holmes
famously said in another jurisdictional context) on which law ‘creates the cause
of action.’”).
194. See id. (“But it is not the only way.”).
195. See id. (giving a hypothetical in which a state statute made violating the
Exchange Act involving naked short selling illegal).
196. See id. at 1570 (“If (but only if) such a case meets the ‘arising under’
standard, § 27 commands that it go to federal court.”).
197. See id. (citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
198. See id. at 1575 (“And that means, under our decision today, that the
District court also lacked jurisdiction under § 27.”).
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federal issue warranting exclusive federal jurisdiction. 199 While
the Supreme Court reiterated its interpretation of § 78aa,200 some
worry about the application of the “arising under” test. 201 Without
further interpretation from the Supreme Court, § 78aa of the
Securities Exchange Act’s “arising under” standard may open the
door to clever plaintiffs drafting complaints without referral to any
federal law to ensure state jurisdiction. 202
The final case providing substance to the legal argument for
federal jurisdiction involving FINRA internal rules is UBS
Securities. UBS Securities involved a dispute arising from the
initial public offering of Facebook, Inc.203 NASDAQ faced technical
difficulties which delayed trading by half an hour on the day that
Facebook went public. 204 Due to these technical difficulties, some
orders of the Facebook stock were not processed, 205 and some of the
confirmation messages ordinarily given to investors when
purchasing stock were not transmitted to the buyers creating
199. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 2016)
(finding an arbitrator violating an SRO internal to fail the “arising under” test
due to insubstantiality of the federal issue involved).
200. See Manning, 136 S.Ct. at 1572 (“In deciding that the state court could
do so, we described § 27—not once, not twice, but three times—as conferring
exclusive jurisdiction of suits ‘arising under’ the Exchange Act.”).
201. See Dale & Harris, supra note 133 (“It therefore remains unclear how
much latitude a plaintiff has to discuss federal securities laws in a complaint
before triggering federal jurisdiction under § 1331.”); see also Case Comment
supra note 56, at 423
However, the Court’s narrow focus on jurisdictional requirements may
perversely result in more unpredictability, both because its
preservation of federalism shores up plaintiffs’ ability to avail
themselves of diverse investor-friendly state statutes, and because
encumbering state courts with federal question analysis creates an
additional line of inquiry that may lead to divergent results.
202. See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 425 (“Instead, the Court’s decision
to restore some adjudicative power to states, paired with the ingenuity of the
plaintiffs’ bar, portends change for litigants in cases alleging any kind of
securities fraud.”).
203. See NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1013 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“On May 18, 2012, NASDAQ was scheduled to conduct the
highly-anticipated Facebook IPO.”).
204. See id. at 1013–14 (“The initial Eastern Standard start time of 11:00 a.m.
was delayed approximately one half hour, largely due to technical difficulties that
NASDAQ encountered.”).
205. See id. at 1014 (“First, over 30,000 orders entered between 11:11:00 a.m.
and 11:30:09 a.m. were not included in the completed IPO Cross.”).
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uncertainty in actual acquisition of the stock. 206 Despite these
problems, NASDAQ failed to stop the trading of Facebook stock. 207
After these incidents, the SEC placed sanctions on NASDAQ for
its failure to follow its own rules approved by the SEC. 208 Due to
the Services Agreement signed by both parties, UBS Securities
brought state law actions in arbitration proceedings for breach of
contract, indemnification, breach of implied duties of good faith
and fair dealing, and gross negligence.209 When UBS filed for
arbitration, NASDAQ sought a preliminary injunction from
arbitration in federal district court. 210 UBS timely filed a motion to
dismiss NASDAQ’s preliminary injunction. 211 The district court
granted NASDAQ’s preliminary injunction, and UBS appealed to
the Second Circuit. 212
First, the court reviewed UBS’s claim that the district court
abused its discretion by exercising jurisdiction over an action only
raising state law claims without two diverse parties to the
action. 213 The court analyzed federal subject matter jurisdiction
under the “arising under” standard found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 214
206. See id. (“[C]ertain trade confirmation messages . . . were not
transmitted, as a result of which some ‘NASDAQ members . . . were not able to
determine whether their orders had been included in the cross and, therefore did
not know what position they held in Facebook securities.’” (quoting SEC Release
No. 34–69655, 2013 WL 2326683, at *8)).
207. See id. (“Despite suggestions that it halt trading in the Facebook IPO,
NASDAQ did not do so.”).
208. See id. at 1015 (“The SEC conducted an investigation into NASDAQ’s
handling of the Facebook IPO, which resulted in the agency sanctioning NASDAQ
for violating the Exchange Act by not complying with its own SEC-approved
rules.”).
209. See id. at 1018–19 (“UBS’s demand does not assert any claims created by
federal law . . . . This, however, does not necessarily preclude the exercise of
federal jurisdiction.”).
210. See id. at 1017 (“In lieu of an answer to UBS’s demand for arbitration,
on April 4, 2013, NASDAQ filed this action in the Southern District of New York
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.”).
211. See id. (noting UBS’s prompt response).
212. See id. (“On June 18, 2013, the district court granted NASDAQ’s motion
for a preliminary injunction and denied UBS’s cross-motion to dismiss. UBS
timely filed this appeal.”).
213. See id. at 1018 (“We review a district court's challenged determination of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”).
214. See id. at 1018 (“Where, as here, there is no diversity of citizenship
between the parties, we look to whether the case ‘aris[es] under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States’ to determine whether federal jurisdiction is
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The court then interpreted the action in dispute under the four
part test for federal question jurisdiction, providing that “federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:
(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and
(4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress.”215 In determining
whether the UBS arbitration claim brought a necessarily raised
and actually disputed federal issue, the court observed that all of
UBS’s state law claims relied on one of NASDAQ’s fundamental
duties. This federal duty required the NASDAQ to operate a fair
and orderly market. 216 The court determined that this reliance on
NASDAQ’s duty fell under federal law because the duty derived
from the Securities Exchange Act. 217 The pertinent sections in the
Exchange Act identified by the court comprised of: the duty to
maintain a fair and orderly market,218 the duty of SRO internal
rules to “remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system,”219 and the
exchange’s duty to comply with its own SEC-approved rules. 220
Overall, the state law claims rested on the duties of the SRO as
mandated by the SEC. 221 The court reasoned that the disputed
federal issue was substantial because NASDAQ’s violation of an
Exchange Act duty to operate a fair and orderly market was
important to the development of federal securities law as a
whole. 222 In the present circuit split, parties disputing federal
properly exercised.”).
215. Id. at 1020 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods.’, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005)). This is known as the “arising under” test and
is now the standard for federal jurisdiction under § 78aa.
216. See id. at 1021 (“UBS’s arbitration demand makes plain that a singular
duty underlies all four of its state law claims: NASDAQ’s duty to operate a fair
and orderly market.”).
217. See id. at 1021 (stating that Congress specified that the fundamental
goal of federal securities law was to operate fair markets).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C) (2012).
219. Id. § 78f(b)(5).
220. Id. § 78s(g)(1).
221. See NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1021 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“In short, ‘it is the propriety of [NASDAQ’s] actions, as prescribed
under federal law, that is at the heart of [UBS’s] allegations.’” (quoting D’Alessio
v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 258 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001))).
222. See id. at 1024 (“In reaching this conclusion, we begin with language in
the Exchange Act stating Congress’s express finding that ‘[t]he securities markets
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jurisdiction claim that an arbitrator violating an internal rule,
feigns in comparison to the duty of an SRO to operate an orderly
market.223 However, due to FINRA arbitration’s impact over the
securities industry as a whole, 224 federal jurisdiction remains
appropriate.
E. Issue Presented
The current circuit split encompasses arguments from the
above cases.225 The Second Circuit argues that there is a
fundamental difference between an SRO violating its own internal
rules and a third party violating an SRO internal rule. 226 The
former finds federal question jurisdiction appropriate, while the
latter requires states to handle the issue. Additionally, the Second
Circuit held that under Manning, violations of internal SRO rules
are not granted exclusive jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 227
The Ninth Circuit fundamentally relied on Sparta Surgical and
15 U.S.C. § 78aa to provide exclusive federal jurisdiction for
violations of FINRA internal rules. 228 Due to the recent and
unknown implications of the Manning decision, the situation

are an important national asset which must be preserved and strengthened.’”
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(A))).
223. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 2016)
(stating that SROs breaching their own internal rules violate § 78s(g)(1), while
third parties breaching internal rules do not breach any federal obligation).
224. See Berry, supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting the large
amount of arbitrations conducted annually).
225. See, e.g., Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (relying
on the holding in Sparta Surgical (citing Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998))).
226. See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 376 (finding an SRO’s specific conduct to breach
the Securities Exchange Act as shown in UBS Securities, but an entity other than
an SRO violating an internal SRO rule does not involve adjudication of a federal
duty).
227. See id. at 376–77 (“More importantly, however, whatever force existed in
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that any violation of internal SRO rules falls
categorically within 15 U.S.C. § 78aa[] . . . it is no longer tenable following the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.
v. Manning.”).
228. See Sacks, 663 F.3d at 1068 (framing the issue as whether the FINRA
arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction).
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regarding violations of internal FINRA rules poses a substantial
issue that requires resolution.
IV. Problems Among the Circuits
The three circuits in disagreement over the issue of FINRA
internal rule violations are the Second,229 Third, 230 and Ninth
Circuits. 231 The Second and Third Circuit held that federal
jurisdiction for violations of internal FINRA rules was
inappropriate, while the Ninth Circuit found federal question
jurisdiction on this issue proper. This Note will first analyze the
Ninth Circuit’s decision granting federal jurisdiction, 232 and then
move on to analysis of the Second and Third Circuit decisions. 233
A. The Ninth Circuit
Sacks v. Dietrich 234 presents the Ninth Circuit’s decision
regarding federal jurisdiction for violations of FINRA internal. 235
Richard Sacks, the plaintiff, signed a contract with Vincent Dang
to represent Dang in an arbitration proceeding in front of
FINRA. 236 However, the original respondents to the arbitration
proceedings sought disqualification of Sacks due to FINRA Rule
13208.237 FINRA Rule 13208, in pertinent part, provides
qualifications for representatives of parties in an arbitration
action. 238 Specifically, the rule allows representation by a person
229. See generally Doscher, 832 F.3d at 372.
230. See generally Goldman v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242 (3d
Cir. 2016).
231. See generally Sacks, 663 F.3d at 1065.
232. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the Sacks case).
233. See infra Parts IV.B–C (analyzing Doscher and Goldman, respectively).
234. 663 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2011).
235. See id. at 1068 (“The district court correctly held that it had jurisdiction
over the action.”).
236. See id. at 1066–67 (stating that Dang and Sacks each signed and
submitted arbitration claim to FINRA).
237. See id. at 1067 (finding Sacks to have initially represented Dang during
two telephone interviews before the respondents sought disqualification).
238. See FINRA Rule 13208 (“Parties may be represented in an arbitration by
a person who is not an attorney.”).
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other than a lawyer unless “the person is currently suspended or
barred from the securities industry in any capacity.” 239 Richard
Sacks was barred from the securities industry in the early
1990s.240 The arbitration panel dismissed Sacks from the dispute,
due to disqualification under Rule 13208.241 Additionally, the
panel found authority to dismiss him under Rule 13413.242 Sacks
filed a complaint against two of the FINRA arbitrators stating that
they exceeded their authority under FINRA rules. 243 The
arbitrators removed the case to the federal district court. After the
district court determined it had jurisdiction, the court dismissed
Sacks’ claims on other grounds. 244 Sacks then filed an appeal to the
Ninth Circuit. 245
While the Ninth Circuit admitted that Sacks’ claims asserted
state law causes of action, the underlying issue turned on whether
the arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction under FINRA
arbitration rules which afforded federal jurisdiction. 246 The court
fundamentally relied on the holding in Sparta Surgical. 247 Most
239. See FINRA Rule 13208(c) (stating three different disqualifications for
representation by a person other than a lawyer).
240. See Sacks v. Dietrich, 663 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Sacks who is
not an attorney, was barred from the securities industry in 1991.” (citing Sacks
v. SEC, 648 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2011))).
241. See id. at 1067–68 (stating that it was undisputed that Sacks was barred
by the securities industry).
242. See id. at 1068 (“The panel based its authority to apply Rule 13208 on
Rule 13413, which provides that a ‘panel has the authority to interpret and
determine the applicability of all provisions under the Code.’” (citing FINRA Rule
13413)).
243. See id. (“Sacks alleged that by disqualifying him from representing Dang,
the defendant arbitrators exceeded the scope of their authority under the Uniform
Submission Agreement, FINRA rules, and California law.”) Misconduct of
arbitrators presents another ground for vacating an arbitration award. See
9 U.S.C. § 10a (2012) (giving examples of arbitrator misconduct, such as refusing
to postpone the hearing).
244. See id. (stating additionally that arbitral immunity barred the plaintiff’s
claims).
245. See id. at 1066 (“Richard Sacks appeals from the dismissal of his claims
against two arbitrators who disqualified him from representing a client. The
district court concluded that the claims were barred by arbitral immunity.”).
246. See id. (finding the alleged wrongful conduct by the arbitrators to be the
application of Rule 13208).
247. See id. at 1068 (“The district court’s order was consistent with our
holding in Sparta Surgical Corporation v. National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.”).
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importantly, the court stated that “if the arbitrators were allowed
to disqualify Sacks under FINRA’s rules, there would be no viable
cause of action.”248 Therefore, despite Sacks’ claims, which were
grounded in state law causes of action, there would be no case if
alleged FINRA violations were not involved. 249 Violations of
FINRA internal rules fell under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.250 Ultimately
the court found federal jurisdiction appropriate under the
Securities Exchange Act’s exclusive grant of jurisdiction under
§ 78aa, in accordance with Sparta Surgical. 251 However, after the
Sacks opinion, Manning abrogated Sparta Surgical in August of
2016.252 Manning delivered a devastating blow to the line of
reasoning followed in Sacks. However, the impact of the Manning
decision remains unclear as to the application involving FINRA’s
internal rules because a dispute remains as to whether the
implications from violations of internal FINRA rules pose a
substantial federal issue warranting federal jurisdiction.
B. The Second Circuit
On August 11, 2016, the Second Circuit decided a case
regarding the suitability of federal jurisdiction for violations of
FINRA internal rules. 253 Doscher filed for arbitration against his
former employers alleging breach of contract, retaliatory
discharge, unjust enrichment, and securities fraud under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.254 After
FINRA arbitration, Doscher filed a petition to vacate the
248. Id. at 1068–69.
249. See id. at 1069 (noting that if the arbitrators were in violation of FINRA
rules, federal jurisdiction would be appropriate).
250. See id. (“Section 78aa conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the district
court because the central question of this case is whether FINRA rules were
violated.”).
251. See id. (finding the district court correct in granting subject matter
jurisdiction).
252. See Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct.
1562, 1562 (2016) (abrogating Sparta Surgical in 2016).
253. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 372 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“Doscher’s argument that a substantial federal question appears on the face of
the petition receives our intitial attention.”).
254. See id. at 374 (stating that Doscher later amended his claim to add the
securities fraud claim).
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arbitration award in federal district court. 255 Specifically, Doscher
claimed that the arbitration panel failed to make documents
available to him in a timely manner. 256 Furthermore, he claimed
that the arbitrators disregarded FINRA Rule 13505 by neglecting
to force the respondents to cooperate in disclosure. 257 The district
court rejected both arguments, stating that violations of internal
FINRA rules fail to present a claim for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. 258
The Second Circuit began its discussion by identifying that
federal question jurisdiction is appropriate when the petition
claims that the award was given in manifest disregard of federal
law.259 However, the court found that FINRA internal rules do not
constitute federal law.260 Doscher’s argument for federal
jurisdiction relied on UBS Securities and the conclusion that
NASDAQ’s underlying obligation enforced by the Securities
Exchange Act to operate a fair and open market warranted federal
jurisdiction. 261 However, the court distinguished Doscher’s case
from UBS Securities because the specific FINRA Rule 13505
merely forced the arbitration panel to require the parties to

255. See id. (identifying the petition as a § 10 petition). The petition is filed
under 9 U.S.C. § 10, which is the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
The filing of a petition under the Federal Arbitration Act alone does not grant the
claim federal subject matter jurisdiction. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983) (“The Arbitration Act is
something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body
of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an
agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.”).
256. See Doscher, 832 F.3d at 374 (noting one of Doscher’s grounds for vacatur
was that the arbitration panel failed to ensure documentary evidence was timely
made available to him).
257. See id. (averring federal jurisdiction appropriate due to the manifest
disregard of FINRA Rule 13505).
258. See id. (finding Doscher’s reliance on § 10(b) of the FAA foreclosed).
259. See id. at 375 (stating that the law must in fact be federal law to qualify)
(citing Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Additionally, under Wilko, manifest disregard of the law remains a ground for
vacating an arbitration award.
260. See id. at 377 (“Doscher’s claim does not present a facial claim of any
manifest disregard of federal law.”).
261. See id. at 375 (finding federal jurisdiction appropriate even though the
claim was grounded in state law claims).
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cooperate with discovery. 262 The rule posed no obligation on FINRA
itself. The court then specifically identified the Sacks case, noting
that the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish between an SRO
violating its own internal rules and an arbitrator violating an
internal rule. 263 The Second Circuit stated that the
appropriateness of federal jurisdiction should differ depending on
the identity of the violator. 264 Although the court noted FINRA’s
obligation to follow its own internal rules under § 78s(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act, the court believed that in Doscher’s and
Sacks’ situations there was no violation of a federal law. 265 The
court then went on to dispute the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
grounded in 15 U.S.C. § 78aa’s grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction for violations of rules under the Securities Exchange
Act. 266 The Second Circuit stated that the Sacks decision is
inconsistent with the recent decision rendered by the Supreme
Court in Manning. 267 The Court laid out the “arising under”
standard for § 78aa, rejecting the broader interpretation found in
Sparta. 268 The first type of suit that falls under § 78aa is one in
which “federal law creates the cause of action asserted.”269 The
second type of suit, which could apply to actions such as Sacks and
Doscher, is when the case “necessarily raises a stated federal issue,
actually disputed and substantial.”270 However, the Ninth Circuit
262. See id. at 375–76 (“Doscher’s claim is, in essence, that the Exchange Act
requires FINRA to require the arbitration panel to require the parties to
cooperate, and the parties did not cooperate.”).
263. See id. at 376 (relying on the Sparta Surgical case in which NASD
violated its own internal rules).
264. See id. (finding the Ninth Circuit unpersuasive in its judgment and
finding a key difference between an SRO violating its own internal rules and an
entity other than an SRO violating the internal rule).
265. See id. at 377 (“There is a critical difference between cases like Sparta
and NASDAQ involving allegations that the SRO breached its own internal rules
and cases like Sacks and Doscher’s involving allegations that someone other than
the SRO violated the internal rules.”).
266. See id. (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 78aa is no
longer reasonable).
267. See id. at 376–77 (finding the Ninth Circuit’s decision no longer tenable).
268. See id. at 377 (stating two types of suits where § 78aa confers federal
jurisdiction).
269. Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,
1569–70 (2016).
270. Id.
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stated that the non-Exchange Act action “necessarily depend[ed]
on a showing that the defendant breached the Exchange Act” or
“that the defendant infringed a requirement of a federal
statute.”271 Because of the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the
absence of a duty created by the Exchange Act to comply with
FINRA rules on non-SRO entities, the Ninth Circuit found federal
jurisdiction inappropriate under § 78aa.272
Despite the claim for manifest disregard of a FINRA rule, the
court found no case for federal jurisdiction. 273 However, the
“arising under” test now found in § 78aa remains untested, in
regard to the substantiality of the federal issue that a violation of
an internal FINRA rule presents. If a court finds the issue
substantial, then federal jurisdiction would be appropriate under
UBS Securities and Manning. 274
C. The Third Circuit
The final case involving the question of whether FINRA rules
constitute federal law is Goldman v. Citigroup Global Markets,
Inc. 275 The Goldmans originally initiated arbitration proceedings
against Merrill Lynch and Citigroup Global Markets for losing a
substantial portion of their retirement account due to an alleged
margin call. 276 The Goldmans asserted multiple causes of action in
the arbitration proceeding including violations of the Securities
Exchange Act, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract,
and negligence.277 The Goldmans settled their dispute with Merrill
271. Id. at 1569.
272. Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2016) (“An
action to vacate an arbitration award on either ground therefore falls into neither
of Manning’s categories.”).
273. See id. at 373 (declining to recognize the failure of FINRA to follow its
internal rules as manifest disregard of federal law).
274. See id. at 377 n.7 (“[W]e think there is no reason to suspect that Manning
called NASDAQ into question, and we are comfortable relying on NASDAQ’s
reasoning here.”).
275. Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 242 (3d Cir. 2016).
276. See id. at 246 (stating that the Goldman’s investor originally worked at
Merrill Lynch, and then transferred to Citigroup where the investor allegedly
engaged in high risk investments for the Goldmans).
277. See id. (noting additional claims of lack of supervision of employees, lack
of suitability of investment recommendations, and breach of fiduciary duty).
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Lynch in mediation, but the dispute between the Goldmans and
Citigroup required resolution in arbitration proceedings. 278 During
arbitration between the Goldmans and Citigroup, the Goldmans
sought interlocutory action from the U.S. District Court stating
that the FINRA arbitration panel was partial to the opposing
party.279 Later, with arbitration complete, the Goldmans refiled
their motion to vacate the arbitration award.280 Importantly, the
Goldmans alleged that the FINRA arbitration panel behaved
improperly. 281 The district court dismissed the Goldmans’ claims
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 282 In the Goldmans’ appeal
to the Third Circuit, they claimed federal question jurisdiction on
three theories: (1) the arbitration relied on federal securities law;
(2) the FINRA panel manifestly disregarded federal law; and
(3) FINRA procedural issues are fundamentally related to federal
law.283 The court dismissed the first theory on the idea “that a
district court may not look through a § 10 motion to vacate to the
underlying subject matter of the arbitration in order to establish
federal question jurisdiction.” 284 The court then turned to the
second theory asserted by the Goldmans. The Goldmans stated
that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded 15 U.S.C. § 78g
establishing margin requirements.285 Through the court’s analysis,
278. See id. at 246–47 (stating that among other allegations the Goldmans
claimed that Citigroup refused to mediate and Citigroup secretly observed the
mediation between Merrill Lynch and the Goldmans).
279. See id. at 247 (dismissing the interlocutory appeal, the district court
stated that the Goldmans should refile the case when arbitration concluded).
280. See id. (submitting the refiled motion to vacate the arbitration award
instigated the dispute in this case).
281. See id. at 248 (“In their motion, . . . they alleged that the FINRA
arbitration panel behaved improperly in that it demanded ‘voluminous’ and
irrelevant discovery from them, did not permit sufficient discovery of CGMI’s
documents, exhibited partiality towards CGMI, and ‘refused to resign’ at the
Goldmans’ request.”).
282. See id. (stating in the district court opinion that federal question
jurisdiction was lacking in the motion to vacate arbitration).
283. See id. at 251 (considering each theory in the Third Circuit’s opinion).
284. Id. at 255.
285. See id. at 255–56 (stating that due to the language of § 78g a margin call
must have occurred). Both parties claim different stances on this issue. The
Goldmans state that there was a devastating margin call, while Citigroup states
that no margin call occurred. See id. at 247 (stating in the arbitration decision
that the Goldmans failed to present any evidence that they were subject to a
margin call).
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it determined that the Goldmans failed to establish a manifest
disregard of federal law because § 78g merely supports their
principal complaint, which is that the arbitration panel acted
partially and corruptly. 286 Moreover, the Goldmans failed to
establish the four parts of the “arising under” standard in their
claim that the FINRA arbitration panel manifestly disregarded
federal law. 287 Due to these criticisms the court found no federal
jurisdiction unwarranted for the allegation of manifest disregard
of law.288
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed whether FINRA rules
constituted federal law. 289 The Goldmans principally relied on
UBS Securities for their position. 290 Although the court did not
dispute UBS Securities’s overall holding on federal question
jurisdiction, the court distinguished the Goldmans’ case from UBS
Securities on a factual basis. 291 The Third Circuit stated that a key
difference in the Goldmans’ case and UBS Securities relied on the
substantiality analysis. 292 NASDAQ is an exchange, and the Third
Circuit stated that NASDAQ’s role in the federal securities law is
much more significant than arbitration procedures of a
non-exchange SRO.293 The court ruled that federal jurisdiction was
inappropriate because, “[u]nlike the [UBS Securities] case, which
implicated the proper functioning of a major national securities
286. See id. at 256 (stating that in order to raise federal question jurisdiction,
the petitioner’s complaint must rely principally on the manifest disregard of the
law) (emphasis added).
287. See id. at 257 (“The claim does not ‘necessarily raise a . . . federal issue,’
nor is the federal issue in question ‘substantial.’” (quoting Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005))).
288. See id. (“In reality, no question of federal law is ‘actually disputed’ here.”)
(quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
314 (2005))).
289. See id. (alleging that because FINRA is a self-regulatory organization,
FINRA rules inherently raise questions of federal law).
290. See id. (stating that one of the main issues in UBS Securities was
whether federal jurisdiction was appropriate despite the fact that the claims were
grounded in NASDAQ regulations and New York law).
291. See id. at 258 (“[I]ts facts are easily distinguishable from the Goldmans’
case because it ‘involved far more substantial questions of federal law.’”).
292. See id. (finding the Second Circuit to weigh substantiality in its holding).
293. See id. at 258 (“‘The substantiality inquiry . . . looks . . . to the
importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.’” (quoting Gunn v.
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013))).
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exchange, nothing about the Goldmans’ case is likely to affect the
securities markets more broadly.”294 On December 23, 2016, Judith
Goldman filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States.295 However, the Goldmans’ petition
was denied on May 22, 2017.296
FINRA arbitrations remain vital to broker and customer
disputes. 297 Additionally, investors must rely on this structure for
non-disciplinary disputes. 298 When an arbitrator manifestly
disregards applicable FINRA internal rules when rendering a
decision, the disparaged party may seek vacatur of the arbitration
award.299 The decision by the Second Circuit in UBS Securities
granted federal jurisdiction over a case where NASD violated its
own internal rules. 300 In addition, the holding in Manning created
the “arising under” standard for § 78aa.301 Together, these two
holdings create a question of suitability of federal jurisdiction for
violations of internal FINRA rules.
V. Argument for Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
Appeals seeking vacatur of a FINRA arbitration award
claiming violations of FINRA internal rules deserve exclusive
federal jurisdiction. First, internal FINRA rules should be
294. Id.
295. See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2016),
petition for cert. filed, 2016 WL 7732953 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2016) (No. 16-874).
296. See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2016),
cert. denied (U.S. May 22, 2017) (No. 16-874).
297. See Berry, supra note 24 (stating that FINRA operates the largest
alternative dispute resolution forum in the world).
298. See Black, supra note 13, at 23 (stating that FINRA is the primary
regulator of the securities industry).
299. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (“In unrestricted
submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the interpretations
of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”).
300. See NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1021 (2d
Cir. 2014) (examining the failure of NASDAQ to fulfill its duty to operate a fair
and orderly market).
301. See Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct.
1562, 1571 (2016) (drawing comparison to the Natural Gas Act in its analysis to
prove that specific language in the statute did not necessarily matter).
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considered federal law due to the structure of FINRA rule
promulgation, 302 courts’ stance on preemption of FINRA
arbitration rules over state arbitration rules, 303 and FINRA’s
unique structure as a purely regulatory scheme.304 Second, finding
federal question jurisdiction for manifest disregard of internal
FINRA rules conforms to the standards set in UBS Securities and
Manning. 305 Finally, finding exclusive federal jurisdiction will
provide a clear uniform standard in cases involving vacaturs from
FINRA arbitration awards. 306
A. FINRA Rules are Federal Law
This Note earlier outlined the procedures for promulgation of
internal FINRA rules. 307 Advocates arguing for SRO rules as
federal law often cited to this procedure, drawing a connection
between the federal system of agency rule promulgation and SRO
rulemaking procedures. 308 An important feature in this process is
the SEC’s receipt of the proposed rule from FINRA and then the
SEC submission of the rule to its own rulemaking process of notice
and comment procedure. 309 This way, the SEC retains direct
302. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (outlining the specific
procedures FINRA must go through to promulgate a new rule, modify an old rule,
or delete a rule).
303. See infra notes 314–315 and accompanying text (demonstrating how
some states have viewed SRO arbitration rules in the context of federal
preemption).
304. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 153 (noting FINRA’s monopoly over the
regulation of the securities industry).
305. See infra Part V.B and accompanying text (examining federal
jurisdiction in light of both Manning and UBS Securities).
306. See infra Part V.C and accompanying text (demonstrating the benefits of
having a uniform system).
307. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text (outlining the procedure
for promulgation of new FINRA rules and modifications for FINRA rules).
308. See NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1021 (2d
Cir. 2014) (“The duty UBS identifies—indeed, the very language it employs—
derives directly from federal law. In the Exchange Act, Congress makes plain that
‘maintenance of fair and orderly markets’ is the animating goal of federal
securities law.”).
309. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1)
(2012) (“Each self-regulatory organization shall file with the Commission, in
accordance with such rules as the Commission may prescribe, copies of any
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oversight of any proposed rules, rule changes, or deletions to
rules. 310 Additionally, the SEC can create SRO rules without input
from the individual SRO. 311 Looking to the legislative history of the
Exchange Act Amendments of 1975 provides information
important to the idea that SRO Rules be categorized as federal law.
The Committee Report states that, “[t]he self-regulatory
organizations, it should be emphasized, are intended to be subject
to the SEC’s control and have no governmentally derived authority
to act independently of SEC oversight.”312 Moreover, the
Committee emphasized that SROs support the overall goals of the
Securities Exchange Act. 313 The close link between FINRA and the
SEC leads to the conclusion that FINRA rules are federal law.
The context of federal preemption supplements the argument
for the characterization of FINRA internal rules as federal law.
State courts found problems with SRO rules in the context of
federal preemption. 314 In Jevne v. Superior Court, 315 the Supreme
Court of California found that because the SEC approves all SRO
rules, those rules remain important to the overall Securities
proposed rule or any proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of
such self-regulatory organization . . . .”).
310. See id.
The Commission shall, as soon as practicable after the date of the filing
of any proposed rule change, publish notice thereof together with the
terms of substance of the proposed rule change or a description of the
subjects and issues involved. The Commission shall give interested
persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments
concerning such proposed rule change. No proposed rule change shall
take effect unless approved by the Commission or otherwise permitted
in accordance with the provisions of this subsection.
311. See supra note 98 (identifying the SEC’s option to make SRO rules
without the input of the SRO).
312. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1476, at 45 (1974).
313. See id. at 46 (“The Committee believes that this redefinition is necessary
to make certain that, in the changed economic and technological conditions of
today, the regulatory pattern of the securities industry is responsive to and
supportive of the basic goals underlying the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934.”).
314. See generally Credit Suisse First Bos. Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119
(9th Cir. 2005) (ruling on the status of self-regulatory organization rules in the
context of federal preemption over state laws); Jevne v. Super. Ct.,111 P.3d 954
(2005) (finding provisions of the NASD Code in conflict with the California
Standards).
315. 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).
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Exchange Act goals of fair dealing and protection of investors. 316
The court concluded that NASD rules preempted California rules
regarding arbitrator disclosure. 317 The Ninth Circuit in Credit
Suisse First Boston Corporation v. Grunwald 318 also found NASD
arbitrator standards preempted California standards for
appointing arbitrators.319 The court relied on the requirement of
SEC approval for NASD rules despite the fact that NASD was a
private organization.320 Additionally, the court noted that before
the 1975 Exchange Act Amendments, the SEC retained limited
oversight of proposed rulemaking procedures of SROs. 321 The 1975
Exchange Act Amendments granted the SEC oversight for all SRO
rule proposals, deletions, and modifications. 322 It also gave the
SEC the option to change or add an SRO rule as the SEC deemed
necessary. 323 Based on the 1975 Amendments, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that the SRO rules preempted state law.324 Following this
line of reasoning, violations of SRO rules warrant federal question
jurisdiction.
B. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Consistent with Precedent
Cases in the future may grant the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to clarify it’s holding in Manning, as well as bring
316. See id. at 964 (noting that conflict preemption was at issue in the case).
317. See id. at 969 (“[The] NASD Code’s provisions governing arbitrator
selection should prevail over conflicting state law, and this determination is
neither arbitrary nor in excess of its statutory authority. Therefore, we conclude
that the SEA, through the SEC’s approval of the NASD Code, preempts the
California Standards dealing with disclosure and disqualification.”).
318. 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
319. See id. at 1128 (noting that the issue dealt with SRO rules and not
specific SEC regulations).
320. See id. (noting the legislative history of the 1975 Amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act).
321. See id. at 1129 (noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission
could only oversee SRO rulemaking procedures in specific subject areas) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012))).
322. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012).
323. Id. § 78s(c).
324. See Credit Suisse, 400 F.3d at 1137 (“[W]e agree with the district court's
ultimate conclusion that the Ethics Standards do not apply to NASD arbitrations
because the Ethics Standards are preempted by the Exchange Act.”).
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continuity to enforcement for violations of internal FINRA rules. 325
While the Manning decision creates a narrow test for exclusive
federal question jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act,
violations of FINRA internal rules remain within the scope of the
Manning decision. 326 Additionally, the scope of the UBS Securities
decision, as well as the legislative history of the Exchange Act
Amendments of 1975, augments the argument that these
violations fall under exclusive federal jurisdiction. Expanding the
scope of UBS Securities provides federal jurisdiction not only to
instances of SROs as organizations violating their own internal
rules, but also when third parties violate the SRO internal rules.
The decision in Manning creates two circumstances where
federal jurisdiction applies under the “arising under” test of
§ 78aa.327 The first instance requires the federal law to create the
cause of action, which remains inapplicable in the argument for
violations of internal FINRA rules. 328 The second circumstance
provides exclusive federal jurisdiction where a “state-law cause of
action is ‘brought to enforce’ a duty created by the Exchange Act
because the claim’s very success depends on giving effect to a
federal requirement.” 329 Due to the nature of oversight by the SEC
of FINRA’s internal rules, violations of the rules give effect to a
federal requirement. The opening for interpretation of the
Manning decision on this specific issue resides in the claims stated
by the plaintiff. In Manning, the plaintiffs never claimed a
violation of an Exchange Act duty, but merely alleged a violation
of the New Jersey Uniform Securities Law and relied on the
interpretation of the SEC rule. 330 Therefore, the “arising under”
test described in the Manning decision still allows the possibility
325. See Dale & Harris, supra note 133 (“Thus, notwithstanding Manning, we
expect to see additional battles regarding the scope of ‘arising under’ federal
jurisdiction in the state securities-law context.”).
326. See Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct.
1562, 1577–78 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the case did rely on
the enforcement of a federal duty).
327. See id. at 1569 (following the same test for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction).
328. See id. (stating that federal jurisdiction is found where a claim originates
in the statute, however, in this instance the statute does not create a cause of
action).
329. Id. at 1570.
330. See id. at 1577–78 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Vindicating that claim
would not require the enforcement of a federal duty or liability.”).
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of federal jurisdiction for violations of FINRA rules. The Second
Circuit in Doscher construed Manning and disputed the fact that
the Exchange Act imposed a duty to comply with FINRA rules on
arbitrators. 331 While Sacks and Sparta present analysis on the
discontinued test of § 78aa of the Exchange Act,332 the analysis of
the SEC’s control over SROs remains pertinent. Moreover, the
impact of the FINRA arbitration process on the system of national
securities as a whole presents a substantial federal issue when
violations of FINRA rules occur. Violation of FINRA arbitration
procedures raises a substantial federal issue due to the amount of
FINRA arbitrations conducted each year333 and the importance of
arbitration to investors and brokers. 334
The Third Circuit in Goldman stated that circumstances like
that of Goldman and Doscher remain inconsequential compared to
the circumstances in UBS Securities where an SRO as an entity
violated its own internal rules. 335 However, FINRA now remains
the leading SRO requiring all brokers-dealers to register with it. 336
Therefore, the implications from violations of internal FINRA
rules, no matter the entity involved, could broadly affect the
federal securities industry.

331. See Doscher v. Sea Port Grp. Sec., LLC, 832 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“An action to vacate an arbitration award on either ground therefore falls into
neither of Manning’s categories.”).
332. See Manning, 136 S. Ct. at 1568 (relying on the “brought to enforce”
language found in § 78aa to grant federal jurisdiction expansively).
333. See Berry, supra note 24 (stating that FINRA conducts between 4,000
and 8,500 arbitrations per year).
334. See Andrew C. Spacone et al., Broker-Dealer Liability: Are the Rules
Pertaining to Providing Investment Advice to Retail Customers About Change?, 64
R.I. B.J. 13, 15 (2016) (“[A] majority of individual broker-dealer disputes that are
adjudicated result in FINRA arbitration.”).
335. See Goldman v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 834 F.3d 242, 258 (3d Cir.
2016) (“Unlike the [UBS Securities] case, which implicated the proper functioning
of a major national securities exchange, nothing about the Goldmans’ case is
likely to affect the securities markets more broadly.”).
336. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012) (requiring all broker-dealers to register with
a self-regulatory organization).
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C. Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Provides a Clear
Uniform Standard

Commentators on the Manning case also expressed concern
with the specific application of the decision. 337 The Court’s decision
in Manning, applying the “arising under” standard to § 78aa,
specifically creates a new problem for state courts. Because § 78aa
confers exclusive jurisdiction and not concurrent jurisdiction as
with § 1331, state courts must now analyze securities cases to
make sure that the dispute does not fall within exclusive federal
jurisdiction. 338 Thus, plaintiffs retain the power to word their
complaints without reference to securities in order to avoid federal
jurisdiction. 339 Future securities cases may present the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to clarify its analysis established in
Manning, 340 by providing an analysis to determine whether
asserting a violation of an internal FINRA rule creates a “‘stated
federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance’ of federal and state power.”341 After the holding
in Manning, state courts now must evaluate plaintiff’s claims
involving violations of FINRA rules under the “arising under”

337. See generally, Case Comment, supra note 56, at 425 (construing the
Supreme Court’s holding and noting its difficulties in future application); see Dale
& Harris, supra note 133 (stating that there remains some ambiguity as to how
much a plaintiff must discuss federal securities law in order for a court to find
federal jurisdiction appropriate).
338. See id. at 426 (“However, section [78aa] establishes exclusive federal
jurisdiction, rather than concurrent federal jurisdiction as § 1331 does. As a
result, it obliges state courts to undertake an additional line of inquiry to ensure
that a cause of action does not fall under federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction
before proceeding.”).
339. See Dale & Harris, supra note 133 (“[A] a future plaintiff who wishes to
stay in state court may play it safe by ‘purg[ing] his complaint of any references
to federal securities law, so as to escape removal.’” (quoting Merrell Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1575 (2016))).
340. See id. (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s opinion provides no guidance on
how to apply the ‘arising under’ standard in § 1331 to situations like the one
presented in Manning, where the allegations of the complaint explicitly
referenced violations of federal securities law without turning on them.”).
341. Merrell Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,
1570 (2016) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 3114 (2005)).
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test. 342 This evaluation may lead to different results depending on
the certain FINRA violations claimed. However, providing
exclusive jurisdiction to violations of internal FINRA rules
augments a uniform standard, and allows state courts to expedite
the difficult application of “arising under” analysis.
Exclusive federal jurisdiction for violations also promotes
uniformity in the securities industry. With the difficulty in
application of securities standards, exclusive federal jurisdiction
prevents differing standards among jurisdictions regarding a
comprehensive federal securities industry. Moreover, the federal
courts may be better equipped to handle disputes arising from
securities arbitration due to their knowledge of the federal system
as a whole.
VI. Conclusion
Regulation of the securities industry changed drastically
throughout the nation’s history. SROs began as private
agreements between individuals trading in the markets to ensure
honesty and reliability. Often after economic downturns, SROs
made broad changes to their policies and implementation of
regulations. After the Stock Market Crash in 1929, the federal
government, through the SEC, began oversight of the SROs. Since
then, the SEC became increasingly involved in the SRO’s
regulation of the securities markets.
SROs retain a unique status within the nation’s
administrative structure. FINRA retains an additional uniqueness
due to its lack of a securities exchange. However, broad oversight
of FINRA remains consistent, and may even increase in the future.
Yet FINRA’s immense impact on the securities industry remains
undeniable. FINRA’s large-scale arbitration and its close
interrelation to the SEC support the idea of a quasi-governmental
entity. Therefore, in alignment with the holdings in UBS Securities
and Manning, violations of its internal rules warrant exclusive
federal jurisdiction. While Birdthistle and Henderson discourage
342. See Case Comment, supra note 56, at 426 (“Thus, a § 1331 inquiry
unilaterally imposes burdens on federal courts to ensure they may properly exert
jurisdiction.”).
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the idea of further taking the “self” out of self-regulation, 343 the
SEC already retains this broad oversight of FINRA rules. Due to
the SEC’s decision-making power over FINRA, federal courts
remain best-equipped to interpret these rules.

343. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 10, at 4 (“We hypothesize that
the rational government would ideally like to maintain the public/private
distinction, but there are forces inexorably driving the government and the
various other players into a less optimal equilibrium.”).

